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Abstract 
The science of mind wandering has rapidly expanded over the past 20 years. During this 
boom, mind wandering researchers have relied on self-report methods, where participants 
rate whether their minds were wandering. This is not an historical quirk. Rather, we argue 
that self-report is indispensable for researchers who study passive phenomena like mind 
wandering. We consider purportedly “objective” methods that measure mind wandering 
with eye tracking and machine learning. These measures are validated in terms of how well 
they predict self-reports, which means that purportedly objective measures of mind 
wandering retain a subjective core. Mind wandering science cannot break from the cycle 
of self-report. Skeptics about self-report might conclude that mind wandering science has 
methodological foundations of sand. We take a rather more optimistic view. We present 
empirical and philosophical reasons to be confident in self-reports about mind wandering. 
Empirically, these self-reports are remarkably consistent in their contents and behavioral 
and neural correlates. Philosophically, self-reports are consistent with our best theories 
about the function of mind wandering. We argue that this triangulation gives us reason to 
trust both theory and method. 
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1. Introduction 
Chances are, at some point when you’re reading this, your eyes will move across 
the page while your mind is elsewhere. This is likely true even if you really want to stay 
focused on what we have to say. People’s ability to remain vigilant toward any one thing 
is remarkably flawed—the mind is rich with internal thoughts, concerns, simulation, and 
feelings that can pull our attention away. Of course, sometimes you can actively shift 
attention. If you get bored, you might look at your phone to check email or social media. 
This kind of attention shift is an active mental phenomenon, as opposed to the more passive 
mental phenomenon of having one’s attention drift away. 
Mental life involves a dynamic coordination of these active and passive elements. 
You can decide whether to go to the store before or after work, deliberate on what to 
purchase, and intentionally buy the fruit instead of the chips (active phenomena), but you 
cannot easily manage your desire to eat chips or your belief that eating them will make you 
happy (passive phenomena). With regards to your attention span (assuming you are still 
with us), you may have decided to read this chapter, but that doesn’t mean your desires to 
keep up with work or friends won’t distract you. 
Instead of reading carefully throughout, your mind will sometimes wander. It might 
wander to an upcoming test, a dinner out with friends last weekend, or a song you recently 
heard. Wherever it wanders, your mind will be wandering away from whatever we’re 
saying. This isn’t something you’ll decide to do, but you will catch yourself doing it from 
time to time. For this reason, mind wandering falls on the passive side of the active/passive 
divide. This isn’t a definition; instead, it’s an example that illustrates the phenomenon’s 
passivity.  
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Special methods are often required to measure passive phenomena like mind 
wandering or dreaming (Windt, 2015; Irving, 2018). In particular, the sciences of passive 
thinking often require self-reports or retrospective assessments of the content or character 
of one’s mental states. However, philosophers and cognitive scientists have raised non-
trivial epistemic concerns about self-report. It is therefore unclear whether we have an 
adequate methodology to study mind wandering empirically. 
Our solution to this problem proceeds through a metaphysical account of mind 
wandering. We explain how mind wandering fits into the wider fabric of human agency, 
which makes sense of the causes and conditions of mind wandering. These can be 
leveraged into a (limited) defense of the self-report methods used to study mind wandering. 
Our chapter has six parts. We first describe the central role of self-report in the 
rapid expansion of mind wandering research over the last 20 years (Section 1). Next, we 
argue that the passivity of mind wandering explains why self-report is necessary for its 
study (Section 2), which may raise skeptical worries about the veracity of mind wandering 
research (Section 3). We then consider whether “objective” methods (Section 4) or studies 
of “intentional mind wandering” (Section 5) can obviate the need for self-report (spoiler: 
they can’t). Finally, we propose a metaphysical solution to the epistemic problems of self-
report (Section 6).  
 
1. Methodological Innovations 
Two methodological innovations explain why mind wandering came to prominence 
in cognitive psychology. First was the discovery of the so-called “default mode network,” 
a set of brain regions associated with task-independent activity. Of equal importance was 
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the revival of self-report methods to measure the wandering mind. In this section, we 
discuss why these two innovations are central to the history of mind wandering research.  
Twenty years ago, almost nobody in cognitive psychology or neuroscience talked 
about mind wandering (notable exceptions include Antrobus, 1968; Giambra, 1995; 
Wegner, 1997). Presently, each of the last five years has seen over 100 articles published 
on mind wandering. One might assume that the reasons for this shift concern the 
importance of mind wandering itself. Mind wandering occupies a significant portion of our 
waking thoughts (Kane et al., 2007; Seli, Beaty et al., 2019). It is associated with a range 
of costs, including higher rates of car crashes (Yanko & Spalek, 2014; Gil-Jardiné et al., 
2017), occupational accidents (Warm, Parasuraman, and Matthews, 2008), and general 
negative affect (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010).1 It also has benefits for self-control 
(Gorgolewski et al., 2014), planning (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011) and creativity 
(Preiss et al., 2016; Gable, Hopper, & Schooler, 2019; for review, see Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2015). But the importance of mind wandering cannot explain its increase in 
prominence within the scientific community. After all, twenty years ago, mind wandering 
was just as pervasive in everyday life and had the same costs and benefits. Why, then, have 
 
1 The Killingsworth & Gilbert (2010) study enjoys some prominence in the mind wandering literature for 
being one of the first large-scale experience sampling studies of mind wandering published in a prestigious 
venue. The paper is cited mainly for two findings: (1) the results that 30-50% of waking thoughts are mind 
wandering, and; (2) the association between mind wandering and negative affect. However, both results have 
been challenged recently. Some studies have shown that the frequency of mind wandering varies as a function 
of the response options provided to indicate mind wandering. Based on how self-reports are interpreted, mind 
wandering can constitute anywhere from 18-60% of waking thoughts (Seli, Beaty, et al., 2018). Moreover, 
the association with negative affect fails to distinguish between different kinds of mind wandering 
(intentional/unintentional) and does not consider relevant trait-level moderators (e.g., mindfulness; see 
Wang, Xu, Zhuang, & Liu, 2017). Reanalysis of the Killingsworth & Gilbert (2010) data shows that 
accounting for interest in the content of off-task thoughts reveals a positive association between mind 
wandering and positive affect (Franklin et al., 2013-a). This shows that the results of the Killingsworth & 
Gilbert (2010) study should be viewed within the context of recent developments and criticisms. 
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the last two decades ushered in so much new research on mind wandering? Two 
methodological innovations deserve the lion’s share of credit. 
One innovation was the discovery of the so-called “Default Mode Network”. In the 
early 2000s, researchers discovered a functionally connected set of brain regions that 
become considerably more active during moments of rest or inactivity than when subjects 
perform tasks (Raichle, 2015).2 This helped to spur interest in studying what the brain is 
doing when it’s not engaged in a task. In other words, what is the brain doing when it’s 
“resting?” This marked an exciting departure from the norm in cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience, which was to exclusively study the cognitive processes that support task 
performance (Irving, 2018; Callard, Smallwood, & Marguiles, 2011).  
Over time, researchers realized that the Default Mode Network subserves 
spontaneous internally directed cognition (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008) 
and that Default Mode activity increases when peoples’ minds are wandering (Christoff et 
al., 2009). Initially, these results suggested that mind wandering might reflect a default 
state of human cognition: the unperturbed stream of thought. That suggestion turned out to 
be overly simplistic, due to evidence that the default network can support goal-directed 
cognition (Spreng et al., 2010) and that other networks (notably the executive control 
network) are active during mind wandering (Fox et al., 2015; see Klein, 2012 for a 
philosophical discussion).3 Still, the discovery of the Default Mode Network helped mind 
wandering emerge as a research topic. It set the stage for observational experiments that 
 
2 Shulman et al. (1997) provided the initial characterization of the Default Mode Network by contrasting 
activations in control states from activations in task states in PET studies. Follow-up studies confirmed the 
identity of the network (Binder et al., 1999; Mazoyer et al., 2001). 
3 Non-human animals, including marmocets and macaques, also have a network that is organized similarly 
to the default network (see Buckner and DiNicola, 2019, for a review). This may also point to a 
dissociation between mind wandering and the default network, if there are independent reasons to deny that 
non-human animals mind wander. 
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were primarily concerned with studying what the brain does when one is not explicitly 
engaged in goal-directed thinking. 
Mind wandering science also benefited from a second methodological innovation: 
the development and refinement of self-report measures. Most studies of mind wandering 
in the lab and everyday life use a self-report method called “retrospective thought 
sampling” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). In these studies, participants are periodically 
interrupted as they perform tasks in the lab or go about their daily lives. They are then 
given a “thought probe” that asks questions about their immediately preceding experiences 
(Figure 1). For example, one influential study asked subjects whether they agree that “At 
the time of the beep [the thought probe], my mind had wandered to something other than 
what I was doing” (Kane et al., 2007). Subjects who answered “yes” were classified as 
mind wandering. The study of mind wandering, then, leaned heavily on participants 
making retrospective judgments about their mental state just prior to being probed.4 
Scientists have relied on these self-report methods to discover many characteristics 
of mind wandering, including (but not limited to) its frequency, costs, benefits, role in 
education, and its relationship to working memory, affect, episodic thinking, mindfulness, 
and the stream of thought (see Smallwood and Schooler, 2015; Christoff et al., 2016 for 
reviews). Indeed, the vast majority of our knowledge of mind wandering is owed (at least 
in part) to self-report. In the next section, we explain why. 
 
 
4 There are many different kinds of self-report used throughout the behavioral sciences. We are interested 
in the kind of self-report described here, namely making a judgment about one’s mental states on the basis 
of retrospective assessments. All subsequent reference to self-report picks out this subset of self-report 
measures. 
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Figure 1: Retrospective thought sampling in a laboratory study (example). Subjects are 
interrupted by a thought probe on average once a minute. They are then asked whether their 
immediately preceding thoughts are related to the laboratory tasks. If not, their thoughts 
are classified as mind wandering. Reproduced with permission from Irving and Glasser, 
(2019).  
 
2. Self-Report and Passive Phenomena 
Self-report is central to mind wandering research. In this section, we explain why 
this is due to the passivity of mind wandering. Specifically, we build on an argument from 
Irving (2018). Irving notes that cognitive psychologists typically study a cognitive process 
by giving subjects a voluntary task that activates that process. But because mind wandering 
is passive, no voluntary task initiates mind wandering. So, psychologists need a “task-free” 
method to study mind wandering, and presently the best “task-free” method is self-report.  







before the probe, 
were your thoughts 
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1) If a cognitive process or state ɸ cannot5 be voluntarily initiated and does not 
reliably subserve the performance of a task, then the psychological study of ɸ 
requires self-report. 
2) Mind wandering cannot be voluntarily initiated. 
3) Mind wandering does not reliably subserve the performance of a task. 
4) Therefore, the psychological study of mind wandering requires self-report. 
 
The remainder of this section offers support for these premises. 
 
2.1. Processes and Reports (Premise 1) 
 Cognitive psychology often relies on experimental tasks in part to avoid the need 
for self-report. Let’s say that a cognitive psychologist wants to study a cognitive process 
or state ɸ. She will typically design an experimental task the performance of which requires 
some behavioral response 𝝉, where 𝝉 is known to activate ɸ. Our experimenter then has no 
need to ask subjects to self-report on whether they use process ɸ in the experiment. For we 
already know that anyone who performs 𝝉 activates process ɸ! We call this approach “task-
based psychology” (for an example, see our discussion of the Go/No-Go paradigm in the 
following paragraph).  
 Tasks can activate a psychological process or state in two ways, depending on how 
directly one can control the process or state. First, some tasks exploit the fact that subjects 
can voluntarily initiate a psychological process or state. We'll say that an agent can 
 
5 The modal scope includes nomological possibility. In §4, we explain why creatures like us in worlds like 
this cannot voluntarily initiate certain activities. Perhaps there are worlds and creatures that differ on these 
grounds. We think it is the job of theologians and poets (rather than this chapter) to consider these 
possibilities. 
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voluntarily initiate ɸ if and only if she can bring about the occurrence of ɸ immediately by 
deciding, choosing, or willing to make ɸ obtain (see Adams, 1985: 8; cf. van Inwagen, 
1989: 410). One example of the use of voluntary initiation is how psychologists use a 
“Go/No Go” task to study inhibitory processes (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan, 2015). 
Subjects respond quickly to targets (e.g. “Go” signs) and withhold their response when 
they receive a stop signal (e.g. “Stop” signs). Because the task is timed, subjects typically 
begin to respond as soon as they see a stimulus, even if it is a stop signal. In stop trials, 
they then have to inhibit their response. Psychologists use Go/No Go tasks to study the 
psychological process of inhibiting an ongoing action. Subjects can voluntarily initiate this 
sort of inhibition. So, anyone who completes the Go/No Go task will voluntarily activate 
the process in question.  
 Psychologists cannot use this direct method to study passive states and processes 
such as beliefs, desires, or dreaming. Agents cannot voluntarily initiate passive processes 
or directly be in some passive state because they can neither come to be in these states or 
bring about the occurrence of these processes immediately. At most, agents can indirectly 
be in some passive state or bring about the occurrence of a passive process ɸ by performing 
another action that she knows is likely to bring it  about that ɸ. Suppose you don’t now 
desire to eat a tomato, for example. You cannot simply decide or choose to have that desire 
in a way that immediately and directly causes you to want a tomato. You can do things that 
make the desire more likely, such as looking at pictures of caprese salads. But this amounts 
to only indirectly controlling your desires.  
Task-based psychologists can sometimes use indirect methods to study passive 
states and processes. Sometimes, a passive state or process ɸ will subserve the voluntary 
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performance of a task 𝝉. If so, psychologists can ask subjects to voluntarily perform 𝝉 in 
order to indirectly activate ɸ. Consider, for example, how psychologists use spatial cueing 
paradigms (Posner, 1980) to study the effects of participant’s beliefs on visual attention. 
Beliefs are passive, in so far as one cannot directly choose or decide to believe something 
(van Fraassen, 1984). But spatial cueing tasks manipulate subjects’ beliefs about the 
location of a target stimulus. Participants are assigned to one of three conditions. In one 
condition, a peripheral cue is presented indicating the location of the target stimulus (this 
is called the congruent condition). In another condition, the peripheral cue is presented in 
a location that differs from the target stimulus (the incongruent condition). In the control 
condition, no peripheral cue is presented. Fixation occurs much more quickly in congruent 
conditions relative to incongruent conditions (Israel, Jolicoeur, & Cohen, 2018). This 
suggests that participants with true beliefs about the target location outperform subjects 
with false beliefs. 
Belief, though passive, can be studied within the standard task-based experimental 
paradigm because we understand something about how belief produces action. Part of what 
it is to be a belief is to play a certain causal role in the production of action and a normative 
role in the explanation of action (Stalnaker, 1984: 4-5, 82). Paradigmatically, the desire G, 
coupled with the belief that A-ing is a means to realize G, will cause one to begin A-ing 
(Audi, 1979). When we know about someone’s actions and desires, we can therefore use 
this schema to infer someone’s beliefs. For example, visual fixation is an action (or a 
component of an action) that subjects use to complete an experimental task. So, we can 
reliably infer that subjects form beliefs about the best location for visual fixation. Crucially, 
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we can make this inference even though belief is passive because we know how beliefs 
tend to subserve action. 
 We argue that there are two conditions under which psychologists can use task-
based methods to study a cognitive process or state ɸ. First is when subjects can voluntarily 
initiate ɸ. Second is when ɸ reliably subserves the performance of a task that one can 
voluntarily initiate. If neither of those conditions obtain, psychologists must use the 
methods of task-free psychology: self-report.  
 
2.2: Tasks and Mind Wandering (Premises 2 & 3) 
Premise 2 in our argument says that one cannot voluntarily initiate mind wandering. 
This is intuitive. People cannot make their minds wander at the drop of a hat and often 
catch their minds wandering (just as you can catch yourself dozing off). People can put 
themselves in a position that makes mind wandering likely, such as reading a boring book. 
But at the end of the day, you must let mind wandering come to you. 
 Premise 3 says that mind wandering does not reliably subserve the voluntary 
performance of a task. Unlike belief, researchers cannot ask subjects to perform tasks that 
require mind wandering because there are no such tasks. Our argument for this premise 
differs, depending on how you define mind wandering (cf. Irving, 2018 for similar 
arguments).  
Most psychologists define mind wandering as task-unrelated thought. In a 
laboratory, this means that our wandering thoughts are (by definition) unrelated to the task 
assigned by the experimenter. But if thoughts subserve an experimental task, then they are 
related to that task. By definition, any thoughts that subserve the experimental task are not 
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mind wandering—at least according to the standard operationalization (Smallwood and 
Schooler, 2015).  
 Others define mind wandering in terms of its dynamics, rather than its relationship 
to an ongoing task (Irving, 2016; Christoff et al., 2016; Sripada, 2018). Dynamic views 
focus on how mind wandering unfolds over time, meandering from one topic to another. 
Such views contrast mind wandering with goal-directed thinking, which remains focused 
on the agent’s task. Irving (2016) appeals to guidance to explain the dynamic difference 
between mind wandering and directed thinking. During goal-directed thinking, for 
example, the agent guides her attention to remain on task-relevant stimuli. During mind 
wandering, in contrast, the agent’s attention is unguided and thus free to meander from 
topic to topic.  
We can now explain why no task can reliably recruit mind wandering. Part of what 
it means to perform a task is to guide your attention to thoughts that are relevant to that 
task. So, any thoughts that subserve an agent’s task will be thoughts that she guides her 
attention towards. Therefore, those thoughts will not constitute mind wandering.  
We now have an argument that explains why mind wandering research relies on 
self-report. Agents cannot voluntarily initiate mind wandering nor can mind wandering 
reliably subserve the performance of a task. The methods of task-based psychology are 
therefore ill-suited to study the wandering mind. Mind wandering researchers must instead 
rely on task-free methods: namely, self-report.  
 
3: Skepticism about Self-Report 
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 Self-report is central to the science of mind wandering. At bottom, mind wandering 
research fundamentally requires that we ask people to reflect on what’s going on in their 
minds. You might think this is a serious cause for concern. Empirical evidence suggests 
that people are notoriously unreliable when they make judgements about their own minds. 
The situation is particularly bad when we use survey responses as data points. Survey 
responses are subject to framing effects (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008), social desirability 
biases (Robins & John, 1997), and simple misunderstanding of the questions being asked 
(Cullen, 2010). Moreover, people are bad at remembering their responses to surveys, 
raising the question of whether responding to surveys activates reliable, reasons-responsive 
processes. Hall and colleagues showed this when they reversed people’s responses to a 
moral and political opinion survey and got people to defend their reversed positions (Hall, 
Johansson, & Strandberg, 2012)! 
 Surveys about experience are notoriously unreliable. Fortunately, such surveys 
differ from thought sampling methodology in important ways. Thought probes do not 
interrogate why you are mind wandering, just whether you are. So, while people exhibit 
unreliability in making process assessments (“Why are you in a particular mental state?”), 
mind wandering research requires state assessment (“Are you in this particular mental 
state?”). Furthermore, thought sampling questions do not ask about obscure technical 
concepts like knowledge or freedom. Rather, they ask about a pervasive and familiar 
experience: whether your mind was wandering or not. Finally, thought-sampling methods 
ask about your immediately preceding experiences, rather than to report on what your 
experiences are like in general. Such methods may therefore avoid the distorting effects of 
memory (Windt, 2016).  
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 We have empirical reasons, though, to trust self-reports of mind wandering.  Mind 
wandering research shows surprising consistency across subjects in self-reports of mind 
wandering (see Kane et al., Under preparation). For instance, there is emerging evidence 
of convergent validity between self-reports and third-party assessments of mind wandering 
(Mills et al., 2018). Self-reports of mind wandering consistently correlate with various 
indirect measures of mind wandering. Some of these are behavioral, such as performance 
errors (McVay & Kane, 2009), comprehension failures (Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 
2004), eye movements (Uzzaman & Joordens, 2011), and changes in response variability 
(Seli, Smallwood, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2015). Other measures are physiological, including 
evoked response potentials (Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 2008), pupil dilation 
(Franklin et al., 2013-b), eye blink rate (Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010), and changes 
in brain activity (Christoff et al., 2009).  
 Of course, none of this is decisive. Global skeptical arguments about even the 
simplest experiential reports (Schwitzgebel, 2008) are notoriously hard to defuse (see Sosa, 
1994). Furthermore, there are critics of self-report within the science of mind wandering 
(see Weinstein, 2018). One issue concerns the distorting effects of thought probes. Studies 
that present probes too often may disrupt the natural flow of thought in at least four ways. 
First, probes may reorient attention to task demands and reduce mind wandering (Seli, 
Carriere, Levene, & Smilek, 2013; although see Robison, Miller, & Unsworth, 2019). 
Second, hyper-probing can lead to increased meta-awareness of one’s thoughts, which 
itself alters the occurrence of mind wandering (Zedelius, Broadway, & Schooler, 2015). 
Third, this increased meta-awareness is a problem in itself: it inflates assessments of the 
degree to which mind wandering is accompanied by meta-awareness. Finally, laboratory 
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tasks are often structurally dissimilar from real-world tasks, meaning that rates of mind 
wandering in the lab are difficult to translate into predictions of rates of mind wandering 
in the real world (see Murray, Krasich, Schooler, & Seli, 2020).  
 Another methodological problem concerns how we define mind wandering. The 
vast majority of self-report studies operationally define mind wandering as task-unrelated 
thought (Mills et al., 2018). Indeed, many task-unrelated thoughts overlap with mind 
wandering. If your mind wanders from topic to topic as your eyes scan this page, for 
example, your thoughts are unrelated to the task of reading. Yet, the standard view has 
come under fire from multiple fronts. Task-unrelated thought is a broad and heterogeneous 
category (Irving, 2016; Christoff et al., 2016). While your eyes mindlessly scan the page, 
for example, you might diligently do mental math for your statistics class. Or you might 
obsessively ruminate on a fight you just had with your friend. Such focused thinking seems 
to contrast with the meandering characteristic of mind wandering. Furthermore, it’s not 
clear how the standard view handles cases of mind wandering in the absence of a task. 
Your mind can wander while you are resting on the beach, but then you don’t have a task 
to wander away from (Seli et al., 2018; Irving, 2016).  
 Cognitive scientists have recently proposed alternatives to the standard definition 
of mind wandering, but it is still an open question how amenable those new theories are to 
self-report. The dynamic view says that mind wandering is relatively unconstrained 
thought, which freely meanders from topic to topic (Irving, 2016; Christoff et al., 2016; 
Sripada, 2018: see §2). Yet the empirical study of the dynamic stream of thought is still in 
its infancy, and ongoing work tells a nuanced story. One study found that reports of freely 
moving and task-unrelated thought are orthogonal in daily life and that the former 
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independently predicts affect (Mills et al., 2018). Another found that unique 
electrophysiological signatures are differentially associated with freely moving, directed, 
and task-unrelated thought (Kam, Irving, Mills, et al., Under Revision). However, yet 
another study failed to find predicted relationships between freely moving thought and 
various clinical pathologies (OCD, depression, and anxiety), as well as a negative 
correlation between freely moving thought and creative idea generation (Smith et al., 
Under Preparation). Additional studies also suggest that measures of thought dynamics are 
redundant with measures of task-unrelatedness (O’Neill et al., Revisions Submitted; 
Murray, Brosowsky, & Seli, Under Preparation). This might suggest that the probes used 
to assess freely moving thought do not yet measure constructs that are readily interpretable. 
Others argue that mind wandering is a heterogeneous construct with multiple 
overlapping attributes that no single instance of mind wandering fully exemplifies (Seli et 
al., 2018). This argument depends on the (contentious) claim that no single definition of 
mind wandering picks out an extensionally adequate concept. On this basis, some have 
begun to propose alternative subjective measures of mind wandering that reflect the 
inherent heterogeneity of the construct (Murray et al., 2020). 
 Our review suggests that psychologists and philosophers have both worried about 
our current self-report measures of mind wandering. But the solutions to these problems 
almost exclusively involve the refinement of self-reports. You may wonder: can we do 
better?  
 
4: Intentional Mind wandering 
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We find ourselves in a pickle. On the one hand, we argue that the scientific study 
of mind wandering requires self-report. On the other hand, there are several reasons to be 
skeptical of self-report methods. You may therefore ask: can we break out of the cycle of 
self-report?  
Our master argument in Section 2 suggests that mind wandering research must rely 
on self-report. Recall that our argument is as follows:  
1) If a cognitive process or state ɸ cannot be voluntarily initiated and does not 
reliably subserve the performance of a task, then the psychological study of ɸ 
requires self-report. 
2) Mind wandering cannot be voluntarily initiated. 
3) Mind wandering does not reliably subserve the performance of a task. 
4) Therefore, the psychological study of mind wandering requires self-report. 
 
If you think mind wandering research can “break the cycle”—that is, can do without 
self-report—then there must be something wrong with this argument. In the next two 
sections, we consider two objections to our argument. The first targets Premises 2 and 3, 
arguing that so-called “intentional mind wandering” can be either voluntarily initiated or 
subserve a task. The second targets Premise 1, on the grounds that “objective” measures 
allow us to study mind wandering without tasks or self-report. We turn first to the objection 
from intentional mind wandering.  
Premises 2 and 3 state that no voluntary task can activate mind wandering, either 
directly or indirectly. You might resist this claim based on empirical evidence for 
“intentional mind wandering.” People frequently report intentional mind wandering—that 
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is, letting their minds wander on purpose—both in the laboratory (Seli, Risko, Smilek, & 
Schacter, 2016) and in everyday life (Kane et al., 2007). Empirical research suggests that 
everyday thinking recognizes the possibility of intentional mind wandering (Irving et al., 
Under Revisions). Furthermore, intentional and unintentional mind wandering are 
differentially associated with independent state- and trait-level variables (Seli, Risko, & 
Smilek, 2016).  
The possibility of intentional mind wandering might seem intuitive. While you’re 
reading this chapter, for example, you might defiantly turn your head away from the page 
and let your thoughts drift from topic to topic. You might then argue that intentional mind 
wandering is a voluntary task that activates mind wandering. If so, then task-based methods 
may be able to measure mind wandering after all (contra Premises 2 and 3).  
Our response to this objection depends on how you define mind wandering. 
Consider the task-unrelated thought theory of mind wandering. On this view, intentional 
mind wandering would consist in you intending to have task-unrelated thoughts. But, in 
intending to have such thoughts, you acquire a task: letting your mind wander. So, your 
thoughts are task-related—not mind wandering. Intentions generate tasks, so it’s 
impossible to intend to think task-unrelated thoughts (see Murray & Krasich, In Press). 
Of course, alternative characterizations of mind wandering might have the 
conceptual tools to explain intentional mind wandering. Some have suggested that 
intentional mind wandering might reflect maintaining variable streams of thought through 
meta-control (Irving, Under Revision). This is similar to contemplative techniques used by 
surrealist painters (Green, 2010) and meditators (Lutz et al., 2008).  
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 Unfortunately, this interesting proposal is limited because the ability to maintain a 
wandering stream of thoughts requires a specialized process—meta-control—and 
employing it likely requires specialized training. Meta-controlled mind wandering may 
therefore differ in important ways from mind wandering in the absence of meta-control. 
But, there is no way to assess this without the use of self-report. Again, we find that self-
report is indispensable for the scientific study of mind wandering.  
Our discussion thus far shows the limits of methods that require direct voluntary 
control over mind wandering. If mind wandering is task-unrelated thought, such methods 
are conceptually incoherent. If mind wandering is unguided thought, such methods cannot 
tell us about mind wandering in general unless we use self-report. But, perhaps we will 
have more luck with methods that exploit indirect voluntary control over mind wandering.  
It is possible to indirectly control mind wandering: you can perform some other 
voluntary task 𝝉 because you know that 𝝉 reliably leads to mind wandering. Suppose that 
after a long day of studying, you want to let your mind wander to clear your head. You 
might do this by taking a shower, or washing the dishes, which are the kinds of boring tasks 
that reliably lead to mind wandering (Mason et al., 2007; Smallwood et al., 2009). You 
might assume that indirect voluntary control provides a route to the task-based study of 
mind wandering. Rather than ask subjects, “was your mind wandering”, for example, you 
might simply give them the kind of boring task that reliably leads to mind wandering.  
 Baird et al.’s (2012) influential study of mind wandering and creativity employs 
this kind of indirect method. They tested whether mind wandering can lead to creative 
insights. This idea is intuitive: when you’re stuck on a problem, for example, you might 
make progress by letting your mind wander in the shower. Baird et al. (2012) tested this 
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idea by having subjects solve a creative problem, take a break, and then return to the same 
problem. During the break, subjects in the experimental condition performed an easy task 
known to induce mind wandering. Subjects in one control condition performed a difficult 
task known to reduce mind wandering. Baird et al. found that subjects who performed the 
easy task were more creative after the break than those who performed the difficult task. 
So, they concluded that mind wandering facilitates creativity.  
But Baird et al.’s indirect method makes it difficult to interpret their results (Irving, 
2018). It is possible that easy tasks facilitate creativity more than difficult tasks because 
they lead to higher rates of mind wandering. But it is also possible that the effect of task-
difficulty on creativity bypasses mind wandering entirely. Easy tasks might lead to 
relaxation, whereas difficult tasks might lead to frustration. And this difference in affective 
state might be what drives creativity. This is not a problem that indirect task-based methods 
can solve. Baird et al.’s subjects do not voluntarily initiate mind wandering or perform a 
task that mind wandering subserves. Rather, they perform a task 𝝉 that has two likely 
effects: mind wandering and creativity. Indirect methods alone cannot determine whether 
the effect on creativity is due to 𝝉 or mediated by mind wandering. To test for this 
mediation, we would need to ask subjects whether their minds are wandering during the 
break, and see whether those self-reported rates of mind wandering predict creativity. That 
is, we would need to rely on self-report.  
Our discussion in this section shows that mind wandering researchers cannot use 
intentional mind wandering to make do without self-report. A careful study of intentional 
mind wandering might lead to the development of direct and indirect methods to study the 
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wandering mind. But, those methods at best complement self-report; they are not a 
replacement.  
 
5: Establishing Objective Measures 
We cannot exploit intentional mind wandering to ground a task-based science of 
the wandering mind. Premise 1 of our master argument states, roughly, that self-report is 
the best (perhaps the only) alternative to task-based methods. If so, it follows that mind 
wandering research must rely on self-report. You might object that there is a third 
alternative to task-based methods and self-report. Tasks and reports are useful because they 
reliably indicate that a process such as mind wandering is active. If we can devise 
alternative indicators for mind wandering, then we can do without tasks or reports. This 
hope animates the search for “objective” measures of mind wandering.  
Seemingly towards this search, researchers have found various objective markers 
that correlate with reports of mind wandering, such as motor response times, task-accuracy, 
and eye-movements. One hope is that those objective markers can obviate the need for self-
report: rather than ask, “was your mind wandering?”, the dream is simply to determine this 
answer by looking at behavior.  
After a careful review of objective methods, we argue that they cannot replace self-
report for two reasons. First, current findings are mixed and likely impacted by 
idiosyncrasies of ongoing task demands and strategies. As such, an indisputable set of mind 
wandering-specific behaviors has yet to be established. Second, self-report is still used to 
establish objective methods. Thus, “objective” methods actually extend, rather than 
replace, self-reports in the study of mind wandering.   
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5.1: Response times and performance accuracy 
Many laboratory studies of mind wandering have integrated thought probes into the 
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & 
Yiend, 1997), which is a task historically used to study vigilance. The SART requires 
participants to respond to nearly all stimuli and withhold responses to infrequent targets. 
Errors of commission and faster responses times (RT) are generally taken as evidence of 
vigilance lapses. That is, it is supposed that participants perform the task more quickly 
because they rely on their prepotent responses to stimuli rather than making on-the-fly 
adjustments, and errors of commission are thought to occur due to the associated attenuated 
response inhibition. 
In many studies, self-reported mind wandering during the SART is also correlated 
with worse task performance and faster RT (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2011; Kane & McVay, 
2012; Thomson, Besner, & Smilek, 2015). These findings seem consistent with 
frameworks of mind wandering that characterize it in terms of executive control failures 
(McVay & Kane, 2010) or lapses in vigilance (Spruyt et al., 2019). The link with faster RT 
is particularly intriguing as a potential real-time, thought probe independent index of mind 
wandering: with faster RT, the more likely a participant is currently mind wandering. 
Unfortunately, this framework is too simple and, at times, inaccurate. Indeed, a few 
studies have found that self-reported mind wandering was associated with significantly 
slower RT (Baird et al., 2014; Bastian & Sackur, 2013). Factors contributing to these 
discrepancies are unclear but may include a variety of interrelated factors pertaining to 
differences in thought content, progression, and meta-awareness of mind wandering 
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(Bastian & Sackur, 2013). Another possibility is that RT variability, rather than speed, is 
actually a better indicator of mind wandering (Bastian & Sackur, 2013; Seli, Cheyne, & 
Smilek, 2013; Thomson, Seli, Besner, & Smilek, 2014), but others have failed to find this 
effect (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2011). Therefore, the collective evidence does not eliminate 
the link between mind wandering and RT in the SART, but it does call into question RT as 
a reliable indicator of mind wandering across experimental conditions. In other words, the 
link between RT and mind wandering seems highly influenced by specific task parameters, 
which challenges the utility of using it as a single, reliable behavioral index of mind 
wandering. 
 A tempting hypothesis, then, is that changes in RT relative to task performance 
could improve predictions of mind wandering. Supportive evidence of this has shown that 
as an iterated task progressed, the frequency of reported mind wandering increased, the 
observed differences in associated RT become more robust, and accuracy decreased (e.g., 
Krimsky, Forster, Llabre, & Jha, 2017). 
 Even this framework, however, is not without its challenges, especially because 
people can perform simple tasks accurately enough even while mind wandering, such as 
mind wandering while driving home from work. For example, Brosowsky, Murray, 
Schooler, & Seli (Under Revision) measured rates of mind wandering during an implicit 
learning task. They found that as participants learned the task, RTs became faster and depth 
of mind wandering increased. Performance, however, improved throughout the task 
(consistent with the task becoming learned). Thus, some tasks are such that as they become 
automatized, mind wandering does not interfere with their performance. RTs and 
performance are uninformative indicators of mind wandering in these situations. 
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Furthermore, people exhibit signs of strategic mind wandering, especially in 
predictable or familiar task environments (Seli, Carriere et al., 2018). Seli and colleagues 
had participants watch a clock hand that moved in discrete steps, completing one revolution 
every 20 seconds. The instructions were simple: press the Spacebar on the keyboard 
whenever the clock hand reached the “12” (upright) position. Using thought probes to 
measure the occurrence of mind wandering, they found that mind wandering was 
significantly more likely to occur when the clock hand was in the second or third quadrant 
(“3” - “9”) than the first or fourth quadrants. People began mind wandering when they 
knew they didn’t need to pay attention, and they returned to the task when they knew they 
should. Accordingly, there was no relationship between the rates of reported mind 
wandering and task accuracy.  
Collectively, findings from Seli et al. (2018) imply that people can continue 
monitoring the task and remain aware of the task environment even when they report mind 
wandering. Again, we see that the link between mind wandering and potential behavioral 
indices is highly influenced by specific task parameters and might not be a reliable 
indicator of mind wandering across contexts. 
 
5.2: Gaze behaviors  
A growing body of research has investigated eye movements as a potential 
behavioral index of mind wandering. Motivating this approach, eye movements are closely 
linked to the visual processing priorities of the visual system (e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1976; 
Kowler, Anderson, Dosher, & Blaser, 1995). This is in part due to the structural and 
functional limitations of the visual system in virtue of the anatomy of the eye, the 
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organization of neurons in the primary visual cortex, and strict capacity limits on attention 
and working memory. People tend to look wherever they are attending (rare exceptions 
include covert shifts of attention) in such a way that best serves ongoing task goals.  
 During mind wandering, however, the visual system becomes, to some degree, 
perceptually decoupled from sensory inputs (Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood, 2013). 
Neuroscientific measures support this idea. For instance, electroencephalography (EEG) 
studies have shown that self-reported mind wandering is associated with attenuated P1 
event-related potential (ERP) component amplitude (Baird et al., 2014; Kam et al., 2011; 
Smallwood, et al., 2008)—the ERP component associated with low-level visual processing 
(Hillyard, Hink, Schwentt, & Picton, 1973). Mind wandering is also associated with 
attenuated cognitive processing of external stimuli, as indicated by an attenuated P3 ERP 
component amplitude (Barron, Riby, Greer, & Smallwood, 2011). Considered together, 
these findings indicate a reduction in the cortical processing of external visual information 
associated with self-reported to mind wandering. 
Changes in visual processing during mind wandering, then, should result in 
corresponding changes in gaze behaviors. Accordingly, research has identified a number 
of changes in gaze behaviors associated with mind wandering, although results have been 
relatively mixed. To illustrate, as one of the first studies to investigate mind wandering-
related gaze behaviors, Reichle, Reineberg, & Schooler (2010) showed that the eyes tended 
to fixate on words for a longer duration of time before reports of mind wandering compared 
to reports of attentive reading. These longer fixations were not related to word length or 
frequency as they typically are during attentive reading (Juhasz & Rayner, 2006; Rayner 
& Duffy, 1986; Reichle, Rayner, & Pollatsek, 2003). This finding suggests that the 
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observed longer fixations durations before reports of mind wandering reflected perceptual 
decoupling, corroborating the self-reports. 
Reichle et al. (2010) suggests that longer fixation durations might be a promising 
objective measure of mind wandering, especially because this relationship has been 
replicated in other work using reading tasks (e.g., Faber et al., 2018; Foulsham, Farley, & 
Kingstone, 2013; Frank et al., 2015, Steindorf & Rummel, 2020; although see Smilek, 
Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010; Uzzaman & Joordens, 2011) as well as scene viewing tasks 
(Krasich et al., 2018). The challenge, though, is that many contemporary frameworks of 
eye movements consider longer fixation durations a marker of increased visual processing 
(e.g., Choi et al., 2017; Coco et al., 2020; Henderson et al., 2018; Luke et al., 2018; Krasich 
et al., In press), which is supported by neuroscientific evidence in reading (Henderson et 
al., 2015) and scene viewing (Henderson & Choi, 2015). Therefore, it would seem as 
though the relationship between mind wandering and fixation duration—and perhaps gaze 
control in general—might also prove to be idiosyncratic. 
 To test this idea, Faber, Krasich and colleagues (2020) asked participants to 
complete a battery of computer-based cognitive tasks while their eye movements were 
measured. These tasks included the SART, listening to an audiobook (while looking at a 
central fixation), reading a narrative story, comprehending an illustrated text, viewing 
visual scenes, watching a recorded academic lecturer, and watching a narrative film. As 
such, the tasks varied across the spatial extent of the visual stimuli as well as the visual and 
semantic processing demands. Accordingly, these tasks should demand very different gaze 
patterns during attentive viewing, and the purpose of the study was to examine whether the 
relationship between mind wandering and eye movements would also vary by task.  
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The findings showed just this contextual variance. Specifically, in tasks that 
required extensive sampling of the visual field (i.e., scene viewing, comprehending an 
illustrated text, and narrative reading), fewer fixations were made prior to self-reported 
mind wandering compared to reported attentive viewing. Depending on the task, these 
fixations were also longer and more spatially dispersed. Conversely, in tasks that required 
more centrally focused gaze (i.e., the SART, listening to an audiobook while looking at a 
central fixation, and watching a recorded academic lecture), mind wandering was 
associated with shorter and more dispersed fixations as well as larger saccades. These 
findings support the idea that the relationship between mind wandering and gaze behavior 
varies according to the idiosyncrasies of the task. 
 These findings pose a challenge for initiatives attempting to use gaze patterns as a 
behavioral index of mind wandering. It is probably no surprise, then, that predictive 
modeling methods (such as those described in Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017) have yet to 
identify a common set of gaze parameters that can be used across all tasks. Still, modeling 
eye movements to predict mind wandering within a task has some potential. Essentially, 
this approach considers a variety of changes in eye movements associated with reports of 
mind wandering in concert.  
For instance, Faber, Bixler, & D’Mello (2018) developed a gaze-behavior-based, 
machine-learned model of mind wandering utilizing reading data from 132 undergraduate 
students across two universities (dataset from Kopp, D’Mello, & Mills, 2015). Specifically, 
this “mind wandering detector” trained a supervised classification model of gaze behaviors 
associated with self-caught mind wandering (participants pressed a key on the keyboard 
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when they caught themselves mind wandering).6 The model included 62 global (content-
independent) gaze features, such as the number, duration, and dispersion of fixations, the 
number of saccades (ballistic eye movements between fixations), and the number of blinks.  
The model was validated using a leave-one-reader-out cross-validation method that 
trained the model on data from n-1 participants and tested the model on data from the 
remaining participant until all 132 served as a ‘test’ participant. The model (SMO) showed 
a weighted precision of 72.2% and a weighted recall of 67.4%. Stated simply, this mind 
wandering detector could accurately (though not perfectly) predict self-reported mind 
wandering from gaze behaviors. Others have used similar approaches to predict the 
likelihood of ongoing mind wandering offline (e.g., Bixler & D’Mello, 2016; Brishtel et 
al., 2020) and in real-time (Mill et al., 2020) during reading. 
 Outside of the context of reading, Hutt et al. (2019) adopted an offline-to-online 
classification-verification approach to predict the likelihood of ongoing mind wandering 
within an artificial intelligence tutoring system (ITS). These authors first gathered data 
from 135 high school students who completed the ITS and responded to pseudo-randomly 
distributed thought probes (probe-caught mind wandering) as to whether they were on-task 
or off-task at a given moment. The authors then used Bayesian networks to classify gaze 
behaviors associated with mind wandering (from a set of 57 global gaze parameters, 80 
content-specific parameters, and 8 features related to the human-computer interactions) 
and a leave-several-students-out cross-validation scheme (67% of students were used in 
the training set and 33% were assigned to the test set) for 15 iterations. Findings showed 
 
6 Faber, Bixler, & D’Mello (2018) actually tested a few different classification algorithms. The best model 
was a sequential minimization optimization (SMO) algorithm, which is an implementation of a support vector 
machine (SVM) classifier. 
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accuracies (mind wandering F1=.59) were better than chance (F1=.24), and this model 
could generalize to data collected from a controlled laboratory study.  
Live mind wandering detection was then tested on a new sample of 39 high school 
students. Students completed the same ITS while mind wandering probabilities were 
generated. Two types of thought probes were distributed throughout the learning session: 
1) a probe that was triggered by the mind wandering detector used to assess hits and false 
alarms and 2) pseudo-random probes used to identify missed mind wandering episodes. 
Findings showed that mind wandering detection (F1=.40) was above chance (F1=.24). 
Collective evidence from Hutt et al. (2019) again indicates that accurate (though still 
imperfect) real-time mind wandering detection can be achieved by training classification 
algorithms on a collection of gaze behaviors linked to self-reported mind wandering.   
 
5.3: Limitations of Objective Methods 
 Classifying eye movements to detect ongoing mind wandering seems to promise an 
objective measure of mind wandering: online machine learning classifiers may allow us to 
detect ongoing mind wandering without disrupting the subject’s task performance or 
spontaneous stream of thoughts. This would ease worries about how self-reports disrupt 
the thoughts they are designed to measure.  
 Yet, even these “mind wandering detectors” do not remove the need for self-report. 
First, we argued that objective measures of mind wandering are not always available and 
require unique classification for each task context. Moreover, this so-called “objective” 
method for identifying mind wandering still has a subjective core. Machine learning 
classifiers are initially trained on data about self-reported mind wandering. Researchers 
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then validate a classifier on the basis of how well it detects said self-reported mind 
wandering. Self-report is therefore still the epistemic foundation of objective measures of 
mind wandering (Irving, 2018).  
 Classifiers inherit many of the other challenges of self-report methods, as well. For 
instance, even supposing that the classifiers perfectly detect self-reported mind wandering 
(which they don’t), they will be trained to detect the experimenter imposed operational 
definition of mind wandering, which is most frequently task-unrelated thought. But we’ve 
already seen that various researchers have criticized this definition (Section 3). Therefore, 
we can develop a more nuanced classifier—that detects the dynamics of thought, for 
example—only after we develop more nuanced self-report measures of mind wandering.  
 Our more fundamental point is that wholehearted skepticism about self-report is 
not an option for mind wandering research. In Section 3, we noted that philosophers and 
cognitive scientists have both questioned whether self-report can ever be a reliable method. 
We think the success of mind wandering science generates a powerful response to this 
brand of skepticism. But, if skepticism still tempts you, “objective” methods should 
provide you no relief, for those methods are only as good as the self-reports that they are 
designed to track.   
 
6. Functional Justification of Self-Report 
We’ve shown that mind wandering science cannot break out of the cycle of self-
report. But, that does not mean we must trust self-report blindly. Instead, we have empirical 
and philosophical reasons to be confident in self-reports about mind wandering. We have 
already reviewed some of the empirical reasons for confidence (Section 3). Self-reports of 
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mind wandering are remarkably consistent in their contents and their ability to pick out 
behavior, neural activation, and third-party reports. If self-reports were spurious, we should 
predict that this consistency would not arise.  
We will now provide a philosophical argument for the reliability of self-reports. 
Recall earlier our discussion of how the functional role of belief plays an important role in 
supporting inferences about it in experimental contexts. We believe that understanding the 
functional role of mind wandering will be similarly helpful in vindicating some of the self-
report methods used to measure mind wandering. Our argument has the following 
structure. We have independent reason to believe two leading (and compatible) theories 
about the function of mind wandering (related to plural goal pursuit and exploration). We 
note that each of those theories makes predictions about the contexts in which mind 
wandering should be most prevalent. Self-reports confirm those predictions. The fact that 
our best theories and self-report methods converge is reason to trust both theory and 
method.  
 Let us start by reviewing two theories about the function of mind wandering.  
 
6.1: Plural Goal Pursuit 
 The mind’s tendency to wander is both salient and puzzling. Studies indicate that 
we spend a lot of time mind wandering (Seli, Beaty et al., 2019). Perhaps this is obvious 
from your ordinary experience. But take a step back and this statistic is shocking. When 
the world is a dynamic, unpredictable, and dangerous place, why would any creature spend 
half their lives being inattentive? What function could mind wandering have that explains 
its prominence in our lives?   
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The first theory is that mind wandering enables scattered agents like us to plan our 
futures. Human beings have hierarchically structured sets of goals, commitments, and 
projects that they aim to complete over time scales of days, weeks, months, and even years. 
This requires balancing many different demands that these place on our time. For example, 
one must balance the demands of being a teacher, being a parent, being a friend, and so on. 
Navigating social space requires living up to the different goals and expectations associated 
with the various roles one occupies. 
 In addition to having lots of goals, people have relatively limited capacities. Some 
of these limitations are physical. The particularities of embodiment preclude us from 
moving in two opposite directions simultaneously. But some of these limitations are 
psychological. Foveal vision does not extend much beyond about 5 degrees of arc. Working 
memory has severe capacity limits (Logie, 2011), items stored in working memory decay 
rapidly (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Oberauer & Kliegel, 2006), and self-control exhibits 
depletion effects over short time-scales (Dang, 2018). These limits present obstacles to 
plural goal pursuit. 
 To do a lot with a little, people scatter their agency over time (see Murray, 2020). 
Non-scattered agents act sequentially, and they can only start a new activity upon 
completing or abandoning current activity. Scattered agents, on the other hand, are capable 
of being engaged simultaneously in various projects without explicitly acting on any 
particular project then and there. In this way, scattered agents act in such a way that their 
actions have distinct (non-overlapping) temporal parts (see Sorensen, 1985). While 
scattering action is an efficient solution to the problem of plural goal pursuit under 
conditions of computational limitation, scattered agency raises unique engineering 
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problems. People must now balance focus on their present activities with keeping an eye 
on acting in the future. 
 Balancing consists in dynamically altering the allocation of psychological 
resources to fluidly pursue multiple goals simultaneously. At any point in time, there will 
be multiple, jointly incompatible ways of allocating one’s psychological resources to 
pursuing distinct tasks. For example, do you focus on answering emails, editing a 
manuscript, or diving into some grading? You can’t do all three at once, and you’ve got to 
do them all eventually. The marginal utility of focusing on any task diminishes over time. 
This creates pressure to switch to other tasks, the phenomenological correlate of which 
might be the experience of effort (Shenhav et al., 2017). However, the possibility of 
switching to a disengaged plural pursuit state can be beneficial, where people think about 
various goals without thinking too hard about any particular goal. This is especially true 
when current task performance is unlikely to improve with increased or sustained focus. 
Mind wandering’s first function is arguably to enable this disengaged plural pursuit state.7 
On this view, mind wandering drifts between various contents, though it is predominantly 
drawn to one’s goals and concerns (cf. Klinger, 2013; Irving, 2016). Mind wandering, then, 
reflects a way of managing limited mental resources for scattered agency. 
 
6.2. The Function of Exploration 
 Mind wandering’s second function may be to help us navigate the explore–exploit 
tradeoff (Sripada, 2018; Irving, 2019). Imagine that you are beginning to write an essay. 
 
7 The term ‘disengaged’ serves to distinguish mind wandering from multi-tasking, the latter of which is an 
engaged or committed form of plural goal pursuit. Roughly, in multi-tasking, someone explicitly commits to 
focusing on several tasks simultaneously. In mind wandering, several tasks can at any one time be at the 
forefront of one’s mind, but there is no explicit commitment to keep any single task (or set of tasks) in focus. 
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Before you put pen to paper, you are faced with a choice. Should you pursue one of the 
ideas that you have already come up with? Or should you explore for a new idea? Explorers 
take a risk: you might waste precious time. But you might strike gold. This decision is an 
example of a fundamental tradeoff between two aims of a cognitive agent: to explore for 
new ideas, or to exploit the ideas we already have in order to get things done.  
 Humans arguably have different modes of thought that are tailored to the demands 
of exploitation and exploration (Sripada, 2018). Exploitative modes of thinking remain 
focused on our goals or personal concerns for extended periods of time and shield out 
distractions. You engage in exploitative thought, for example, when you successfully guide 
your attention to this chapter for long enough to get through a few pages. Exploitative 
thinking is necessary for limited agents like us. At any time, you can only focus on a tiny 
subset of all the relevant information. To make this subset count, you must be able to focus 
on what you think is relevant (e.g. this chapter) and ignore almost limitless things that 
might distract you.  
Exploitation is an incomplete strategy, however, because you can be wrong about 
what is in fact relevant to you. Imagine that you dutifully guide your attention to this 
chapter, and nothing but, for a whole day. We the authors would be thrilled! But we 
recognize that you might miss out. Perhaps you would forget about other commitments that 
you have made. Or you might simply fail to expand the sphere of what you are reading and 
thinking about. By constantly guiding your attention to what you think is relevant, you risk 
being caught in a cognitive bubble, where you never notice the information that would lead 
you to expand your own point of view.   
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Exploratory modes of thought such as mind wandering may help us burst cognitive 
bubbles. When your mind drifts between topics, you may think of ideas that seem strange, 
useless, or irrelevant. This is not a bug of mind wandering, but a feature. For seemingly 
useless information can turn out to be crucial. Seemingly irrelevant ideas may be just what 
you need to expand your point of view. Mind wandering, then, may be an inbuilt mode of 
cognitive exploration that helps us take risks and search for new ideas. Most of the time, 
this exploration may prove useless. But sometimes it will strike gold.  
 
6.3: Triangulation of Function and Method 
 We have sketched two theories about the functions of mind wandering. First, mind 
wandering supports plural goal pursuit. Second, mind wandering supports cognitive 
exploration. Despite their differences, these theories generate common a priori predictions 
about the circumstances likely to elicit mind wandering.  
Mind wandering should occur when we are bored or under-stimulated. Both of our 
functional theories contrast mind wandering with more focused forms of thinking, which 
occur when we are pursuing a single important goal (e.g. writing an exam or running from 
a tiger). We should therefore expect mind wandering to occur when people are bored, as 
boredom reflects a perceived lack of important information to extract from the task 
environment. Relatedly, we should expect strategic mind wandering in familiar and 
predictable task environments. Such environments are structured in ways where task 
performance does not benefit from sustained focus on the task (Kane et al., 2017). When 
engaged in boring or predictable tasks, we can free our cognitive resources to focus on the 
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type of plural goal-pursuit and/or exploration characteristic of mind wandering (Geana, 
Wilson, Daw, & Cohen, 2016).  
Results from self-report studies are consistent with our a priori predictions about 
the circumstances likely to elicit mind wandering. For example, mind wandering is more 
frequent when people are bored, understimulated, or doing something either too easy or 
too difficult (Eastwood, Frischen, Fenske, & Smilek, 2012). People report that mind 
wandering is more pleasant when they are doing something unengaging, which suggests 
that mind wandering relieves boredom (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013). The conditions 
that we expect to elicit mind wandering turn out to be the conditions where we observe a 
lot of mind wandering. 
The fact that our best functional theories and self-report methods converge is reason 
to trust both theory and method. Consider an analogy. Imagine that we have two very 
different methods to estimate a quantity, such as the density of gold. Can we trust that our 
methods are accurate? Well, suppose we find that each method is internally consistent: they 
yield the same measurements at different times and for different samples of gold. Suppose 
further that the methods are consistent with each other: both estimate the density at 19.32 
cm3. Unless we have reason to think otherwise, the best explanation of this internal and 
external consistency is that a) the density of gold is 19.32 cm3 and b) both methods can 
accurately estimate this density. The fact that diverse methods triangulate onto a single 
answer gives us reason to trust both methods.  
We think a similar form of triangulation gives us reason to trust self-report methods 
in mind wandering science. Self-report methods are internally consistent, at least about the 
result that variables like boredom elevate mind wandering. Self-report methods are also 
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consistent with independently plausible theories about the function of mind wandering. Put 
colloquially, one reason to believe self-reports about mind wandering is that they make 
sense.  
Put more precisely, philosophical argumentation and self-report are both reliable 
methods for forming beliefs about mind wandering. These methods triangulate onto 
common claims about mind wandering: for example, that boring tasks elevate mind 
wandering. Unless we have reason to think otherwise, the best explanation for this 
triangulation is a) that mind wandering occurs more frequently in boring and undemanding 
tasks and b) that philosophical argumentation and self-report are both accurate. 
We have focused on predictions about boredom. But triangulation has much 
broader application in the science of mind wandering. We can generate more consensus 
predictions from our best theories of the function of mind wandering. We can then see 
whether self-report methods yield results that make sense, given these predictions. If they 
do, this gives us defeasible reason to trust that self-reports about mind wandering are 
accurate. Mind wandering science may be unable to do without self-report. But our trust in 
self-report can be based in theory, rather than blindness.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Mind wandering science cannot do without self-report. At best, objective measures 
complement self-report methods, but do not replace them. This is not a defect of mind 
wandering research, but a reflection of the kind of cognitive state mind wandering is: a 
passive manifestation of agency. We suspect that there are many other passive 
manifestations of agency that are inaccessible to purely task-based methodologies. As such, 
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research on mind wandering provides valuable lessons on how to refine self-report 
methodologies and use them in conjunction with more standard methods in cognitive 
psychology and neuroscience. 
 Skeptics about the reliability of self-report may take this as reason to doubt mind 
wandering science. Our response to the skeptic appeals to the metaphysics of mind 
wandering to partially vindicate self-report methods. This response highlights how 
theoretical models play an important role in verifying the accuracy of experimental 
methods. When the outputs of these methods (data) converge with the predictions of the 
model, this is crucial evidence for the validity of empirical methods. Convergence, then, 
also provides evidence in favor of the model. The justificatory pathway between theory 
and data runs both ways. This runs contrary to a tendency in cognitive psychology to 
separate theory and data, with data being considered the only source of evidence. Theories, 
on this view, might make predictions that guide the acquisition of data, but theories 
themselves are not considered sources of evidence. Our argument depends on this being 
wrong; instead, the theoretical content of and argument for a model both play important 
roles in verifying both methods and the model itself. This is consistent with a model-based 
view of scientific methodology that began to flourish as a reaction against the logical 
positivism of the 20th century (see Kuhn, 1962; Feyerabend, 1969; Tal, 2011).  
While this is a longer story than we have space here to tell, we want to highlight 
the fact that, on our view, philosophical theorizing plays an important role in generating 
evidence insofar as such theorizing can produce models. Our argument is one example of 
this. The functional characterizations of mind wandering offered above are drawn from 
philosophical reflections on mind wandering, attention, and action. This suggests that 
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philosophers have a more active role to play in empirical inquiry than simply double-
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